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Abstract
Using dynamic panel data models, we examine the e⁄ect of capital re-
quirement on banks￿ behavior in Indonesia. We ￿nd inconclusive results.
Some banks tend to comply with capital requirement: They increase their
capital ratio when their CAR is lower than, or falling towards, the eight
percent regulatory minimum. However, most of our results are statistically
signi￿cant at 20-30% level of signi￿cance only. Moreover, our results are
mostly driven by private domestic banks and heavily-undercapitalized banks
that were closely monitored by regulator in the aftermath of the 1998 cri-
sis. Whether, in normal circumstances, banks in developing countries like
Indonesia comply with capital requirement, therefore, remains questionable.
This implies that, if regulators in developing countries continue relying on
capital regulation, they would also need to improve their supervision capac-
ity, increase the transparency of ￿nancial reporting, and strengthen market
monitoring of banks.
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11 Introduction
This paper examines the e⁄ect of capital requirement on banks￿behavior in Indone-
sia. We focus on the case of a developing country to see how this regulation fares
in an environment where prudential regulation may not be as e⁄ective as that in
the developed world.
The central question is whether banks in developing countries like Indonesia
comply with capital requirement. Do banks increase their capital adequacy ratio
(CAR)￿ the ratio between bank￿ s capital and its risk-weighted assets￿ when the
ratio is lower than, or approaching the regulatory minimum? How do they increase
capital ratios: by increasing capital or reducing risk? Do su¢ ciently capitalized-
and undercapitalized banks behave di⁄erently?
Regulator imposes capital requirement on banks to control banks￿risk-taking.
Following the Basel Accord, regulator typically requires banks to hold capital at
least 8% of their risk-weighted assets.1 Banks may or may not invest in high-risk
assets; but if they do so, they have to commit su¢ cient amount of capital on the
line.
Banks facing capital requirement, however, may not behave as regulator wants
them to. At the outset, risk-based capital requirement could work well if the risk-
weightings capture the true banks￿business risk. Some argue that asset-risk classi-
￿cations of the Basel Accord are too coarse so that, to take more risk and maintain
capital ratio, banks may shift their portfolios from low-risk to high-risk assets within
each risk category. Moreover, if banks￿franchise value is low, banks may gamble
for resurrection today to comply with the capital requirement tomorrow.2
On the other hand, if regulatory penalties are severe and raising capital in-
1See Basel (2003) for a detailed description of Basel￿ s risk-based capital requirement.
2See Santos (2001) for a theoretical literature review of bank capital regulation.
2stantaneously is costly, banks may hold a bu⁄er of excess capital to reduce the
probability of having capital ratio falls below the minimum requirement. Whenever
banks￿capital falls below a threshold, which may still be higher than the minimum
requirement, banks increase their capital ratio by raising capital or reducing risk.3
To estimate the e⁄ect of capital requirement on banks￿behavior, we regress
banks￿capital and risk on an indicator for regulatory pressure and a set of control
variables using dynamic panel data models. The coe¢ cient of regulatory pressure
dummy￿ equals one for banks which are under regulatory pressure to comply with
the capital regulation and zero otherwise￿ would then measure how banks, con-
strained by capital requirement, choose their capital and risk.
We build upon the partial adjustment model developed by Shrieves and Dahl
(1992).4 However, we depart from this literature in three ways. First, we argue
that the system of two equations of banks￿capital and risk typically estimated
in this line of literature are not autonomous. Therefore, estimating the model
using simultaneous equation approach is inappropriate. Second, we use panel data
analysis so that we could control for banks￿heterogeneity better. To the best of our
knowledge, except Heid, Porath and Stolz (2004), empirical works in the literature
so far have been using pooled data analysis. Third, assuming that banks￿business
entity remains the same during the period of analysis, and banks would therefore
have the same target capital and risk levels, we could eliminate the unobservable
banks￿internal target capital- and risk levels by di⁄erencing. In the literature, these
unobservable target levels are approximated by a number of proxies.
We ￿nd inconclusive results. Banks tend to comply with capital requirement:
3See, for example, Milne and Whalley (2001) and Milne (2002).
4For this line of literature, see for example Jacques and Nigro (1997) and Aggarwal and Jacques
(1998), which￿ like Shrieves and Dahl (1992)￿ examine US￿banks. Rime (2001) analyzes banks in
Switzerland, while Kle⁄ and Weber (2005) and Heid, Porath and Stolz (2004) look at Germany￿ s
banks.
3They increase their CAR when the ratio is lower than, or falling towards, the
8% regulatory minimum. Banks whose CAR below 8% do so primarily by raising
capital, while banks whose CAR are approaching the 8% minimum from above
prefer reducing risk rather than increasing capital.
However, most of our results are statistically signi￿cant at 20-30% level of sig-
ni￿cance only. Moreover, our results are mostly driven by private domestic banks
and heavily-undercapitalized banks that were closely monitored by regulator in the
aftermath of the 1998 crisis. Whether, in normal circumstances, Indonesian banks
comply with capital requirement, therefore, remains questionable.
These results shed light on how banks in developing countries respond to capital
requirement. In contrast to the ￿ndings in the literature that banks in developed
countries comply with capital requirement, we do not ￿nd similarly strong evidence
of compliance in Indonesia: Statistically, banks that are under pressure from reg-
ulator to increase their CAR behave just like adequately capitalized banks. This
may imply that, if regulators in developing countries continue relying on capital
regulation, they would need to improve their supervision capacity, increase the
transparency of ￿nancial reporting, and strengthen market monitoring of banks.
This paper proceeds follows: In Section 2 we describe capital requirement in
Indonesia. Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 describes the data and
Section 5 discusses empirical results. In Section 6 we present robustness checks.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Capital Requirement in Indonesia
On paper, capital requirement has been the backbone of Indonesia￿ s prudential reg-
ulation since 1991 when Indonesia adopted the newly minted Basel Accord. The
central bank, Bank Indonesia, which is also the regulator, requires banks to main-
4tain capital at least 8% of risk-weighted assets. Along with other prudential regu-
lations, regulator also imposes prompt corrective action (PCA)￿ the quantitative-
rating system based on banks￿capital, asset, management, equity, and liquidity
(CAMEL)￿ on Indonesian banks. 5
However, in practice, regulator had not always been able to enforce prudential
regulations, including capital requirement. Financial crises in the 1990s forced reg-
ulator to forbear capital requirement several times. Suharto￿ s administration often
interfered and prevented regulator from closing failed-banks. Bogus accounting was
the norm, and non-compliance was rarely penalized. Besides, according to public
opinions, Bank Indonesia then had yet to acquire experience and technical skills in
banking regulation and supervision.
The turning point of bank regulation in Indonesia was the 1998 ￿nancial cri-
sis. Once again, Bank Indonesia forborne prudential regulation. This time however
many banks were closed, some were merged, and others had to recapitalize them-
selves to avoid closing. More importantly, as part of the International Monetary
Fund￿ s sponsored economic reforms, a new central banking law was enacted, and
this law enabled Bank Indonesia to be more independent.6
Since then, Bank Indonesia has strengthened a number of prudential regulations,
including a new and more thorough ￿nancial reporting system. It also is building
its capacity to regulate and supervise banks.
5The PCA follows the 1991 US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act.




The literature following Shrieves and Dahl (1992) models the observed changes
in banks￿capital and risk as the sum of banks￿discretionary adjustment and ex-
ogenous shocks to capital and risk as follows:
￿Capitalit = ￿
dCapitalit + Ecit (1)
￿Riskit = ￿
dRiskit + Erit (2)
where ￿Capitalit and ￿Riskit are respectively the observed changes in bank i￿ s
capital and risk in period t respectively; ￿dCapitalit and ￿dRiskit are bank i￿ s
discretionary changes in capital and risk in period t; and Ecit and Erit are exogenous
shocks to banks i￿ s capital and risk in period t.
To recognize that banks may not be able to adjust their desired capital and risk
instantaneously, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) assume that the discretionary changes
in banks￿capital and risk are proportional to the di⁄erence between banks￿target
capital and risk levels and their corresponding values in the previous period, i.e.:
￿
dCapitalit = ￿1 (Capital
￿
it ￿ Capitalit￿1) (3)
￿
dRiskit = ￿2 (Risk
￿
it ￿ Riskit￿1) (4)
where Capital￿
it and Risk￿
it are bank i￿ s target capital and risk levels respectively.
Substituting these two equations into Equations (1) and (2), the equations for
the observed changes in banks￿capital and risk then become
￿Capitalit = ￿1 (Capital
￿
it ￿ Capitalit￿1) + Ecit (5)
￿Riskit = ￿2 (Risk
￿
it ￿ Riskit￿1) + Erit (6)
The observed changes in banks￿capital and risk are therefore a function of target
capital or risk level, lagged capital or risk, and some exogenous variables. The
6coe¢ cient ￿ is the speed of adjustment￿ it measures how fast banks adjust their
current capital or risk to the corresponding target level.
They then derive regression models for observed changes in capital and risk
from the capital equation, Equation (5), and risk equation, Equation (6). First,
the banks￿target capital and risk levels, Capital￿
it and Risk￿
it, are not observed,
and have to be approximated. Second, appealing to the theoretical literature that
banks may choose capital and risk simultaneously, they put a measure of risk on
the right hand side of the capital equation and capital on the right hand side of
the risk equation. Third, banks that are under regulatory pressure to comply with
the capital requirement may be forced to increase capital or reduce risk more than
adequately capitalized banks. To capture this idea, they introduce an indicator for
regulatory pressure Regit￿1as an additional explanatory variable. It equals one if
bank i at time t ￿ 1 is under regulatory pressure and zero otherwise.
They then specify the working regressions as follows:
￿Capitalit = ￿01 + ￿1Regit￿1 ￿ ￿1Capitalit￿1 + ￿1xit + ￿1￿Riskit + ￿it (7)
￿Riskit = ￿02 + ￿2Regit￿1 ￿ ￿2Riskit￿1 + ￿2xit + ￿2￿Capitalit + ￿it (8)
which are usually estimated using simultaneous equation methods.
We depart from this approach in three ways. First, we recognize that banks de-
termine the combination of Capitalit and Riskit simultaneously. However, because
the equations are not autonomous, introducing ￿Capitalit and ￿Riskit in the right
hand sides of Equation (7) and (8), respectively, is not appropriate.7 These equa-
tions would be meaningless because there is no way to examine what happens to
changes in banks￿capital, ￿Capitalit, if bank i is under regulatory pressure (Regit￿1
equals one ) holding the change in banks￿risk, ￿Riskit, constant. Starting from
7According to Wooldridge (2002), this inappropriate use of simultaneous equation models is
quite common in the empirical literature.
7Equations (5) and (6), our capital and risk equations are therefore as follows:
￿Capitalit = ￿1Regit￿1 + ￿1 (Capital
￿
it ￿ Capitalit￿1) + ￿1xit + ￿
0
i + ￿t + ￿it (9)
￿Riskit = ￿2Regit￿1 + ￿2 (Risk
￿
it ￿ Riskit￿1) + ￿2xit + ￿
0
i + ￿t + ￿it (10)
where ￿Capitalit and ￿Riskit are the observed changes in bank i￿ s capital and risk
in period t respectively; Regit￿1 is a dummy variable equals one if bank i in period
t￿1 is under regulatory pressure to comply with the capital requirement; Capital￿
it
and ￿Risk￿
it are bank i￿ s target capital and risk levels in period t respectively; xit
is a vector of characteristics of bank i at time t; ￿
0
i and ￿0
i are bank i￿ s ￿xed e⁄ects,
and ￿t and ￿t are time-e⁄ects at time t; the error term ￿it and ￿it are bank time-
varying errors, assumed to be distributed independently of ￿
0
i and ￿t and ￿0
i and ￿t
respectively.
Second, taking advantage of the panel structure of our data, we could control
for time-invariant banks￿characteristics more explicitly by introducing banks￿￿xed
e⁄ects in addition to the vector of control variables xit.
Third, rather than approximating banks￿target levels by a number of proxies,
we assume that, during the period of our analysis, after controlling for banks￿char-
acteristics, banks￿business entity remains the same and therefore banks would have
the same target capital and risk levels. Target capital and risk levels then become
time-invariants Capital￿
i and Risk￿
i respectively, and therefore submerge into banks￿
￿xed e⁄ects, respectively ￿
0
i and ￿0
i. The capital and risk equations become:
￿Capitalit = ￿1Regit￿1 ￿ ￿1Capitalit￿1 + ￿1xit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it (11)
￿Riskit = ￿2Regit￿1 ￿ ￿2Riskit￿1 + ￿2xit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it (12)
where the ￿xed e⁄ects ￿i and ￿i replace (￿
0
i + ￿1CAP ￿
i ) and (￿0
i + ￿2CAP ￿
i ) respec-
tively.
8To facilitate standard estimation, we modify Equation (11) and (12) by adding
CAPit￿1 to both sides of Equation (11) and RISKit￿1 to both sides of Equation
(12). Our speci￿cation then simpli￿es into standard dynamic panel data models,
i.e.:
Capitalit = ￿1Regit￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)Capitalit￿1 + ￿1xit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it (13)
Riskit = ￿2Regit￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿2)Riskit￿1 + ￿2xit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it (14)
We proceed as follows: First, to see how banks choose capital ratio, the combi-
nation of both Capital and Risk, we estimate a similar regression in which we use
capital ratio, CAR, as the dependent variable as follows:
CARit = ￿3Regit￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿3)CARit￿1 + ￿3xit + ’i +  t + !it (15)
where CAR = Capital = Risk:
Then, to examine how banks comply with the capital requirement, by increasing
capital or reducing risk, we estimate Equations (13) and (14). Unlike past works, we
do not use simultaneous equation models, however. Rather, we estimate the capital
and risk equations separately without controlling for risk and capital, respectively,
in each equation.
3.2 Hypotheses
We take as the null hypotheses that banks under regulatory pressure behave
like those which are not. We therefore state our main hypothesis as follows:
H1 : Regulatory pressure to comply with the capital requirement does not a⁄ect
banks￿capital decision.
H2 : Regulatory pressure does not a⁄ect banks￿risk decision.
9Our primary interest is therefore the signi￿cance and magnitude of the ￿s￿
the coe¢ cients of REGit￿1 in Equations (13-15). Large positive ￿1 and ￿3, and
negative ￿2 would be against our hypothesis, i.e. banks that are under regulatory
pressure to comply with the capital requirement would raise more capital or reduce
more risk compared to adequately capitalized banks.
We also expect (1 ￿ ￿), the coe¢ cient of lagged dependent variable, to be pos-
itive. From these estimates we could then get the speed of capital- and risk adjust-
ment, ￿. Positive estimates of speed of adjustment suggest that banks adjust its
capital and risk towards its own target capital- and risk levels over time. The larger
the ￿, the faster banks adjust their capital or risk toward the target levels.
Among banks￿characteristics in the vector of control variables xit are banks￿
size and income. Larger banks may need to raise larger capital and reduce larger
risk ceteris paribus. The more pro￿table banks may be able to raise larger capital
and reduce more risk, though these banks could a⁄ord higher risk too.
3.3 Method of Estimation
We estimate the basic regressions in Equations (13-15) using dynamic panel
data technique, i.e. both Arellano and Bond (1991)￿ s ￿rst-di⁄erenced GMM esti-
mator and Blundell and Bond (1998)￿ s system GMM estimator.
To eliminate the individual e⁄ects, we ￿rst take the ￿rst-di⁄erence of the mod-
els. Then we instrument all endogenous- and pre-determined variables by a set of
instrumental variables.
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest that we use entire lagged of endogenous-
and pre-determined variables as instruments and then estimate the model using
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Because the number of period (T) in our
sample is 19 and the number of group (N) is about 130, should we use the entire
10lag, the number of instruments would be large. To avoid having biased estimates
because of too many instruments, we therefore present the results using two- and
three lagged of endogenous variables and one- and two lagged of pre-determined
variables only.
Because the lagged level may be poor instruments for ￿rst di⁄erence, Blundell
and Bond (1998) further propose adding the lagged-di⁄erences of endogenous and
pre-determined variables as instruments. For the same reasons like the above, we
present the results of system GMM using two- and three lagged of endogenous
variables and one- and two lagged of pre-determined variables only. Because the
two-step estimates of standard errors may be severely downward-biased, we use the
￿nite-sample correction of covariance matrix derived by Windmeijer (2005).
We also present the results of ￿xed e⁄ect and OLS for our basic speci￿cations
to see whether the coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable of GMM estimators are
biased.
4 Data
We use the quarterly ￿nancial statement of Indonesian banking industry provided
by the Bank Indonesia￿ s Department of Banking Statistics. The dataset consists
of quarterly ￿nancial reports of about 130 banks over more than four-year period
since the fourth quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2005. It covers all com-
mercial banks in Indonesia, and, because Indonesia￿ s capital markets are still quite
small, this data represents a large portion of Indonesia￿ s ￿nancial industry. It ex-
cludes, however, the typically small Indonesia￿ s saving and loan institutions (Bank
Perkreditan Rakyat).8
8A few banks do not submit ￿nancial reports for a number of quarters. These missing obser-
vations however are a small proportion of our sample and therefore would not a⁄ect our results
much. At the time we process the dataset, some banks have not reported their ￿nancial statement
for the last quarter in our sample, the second quarter of 2005.
11This ￿nancial statement provides detailed ￿nancial information about each bank.
In particular, it provides banks￿assets and liabilities as well as their capital, risk-
weighted assets, and CAR which are important in analyzing the e⁄ect of capital
requirement on bank behavior.
There are six types of bank ownership. Our sample for the year of 2001, for
example, includes 5 state-owned banks, 35 large private-domestic banks, 37 small
private-domestic banks, 26 regional-development banks, 18 joint-venture banks, and
11 foreign-owned banks.9 State-owned banks are among the largest, followed by
large private-domestic banks and small private-domestic banks. The largest eight
banks have 80% of Indonesia￿ s banking assets. Except state banks and a few large-
private domestic banks, most other banks are quite small.
Despite the apparent heterogeneity of banks, for our basic speci￿cations, we
keep all banks in our sample. Later, to see the robustness of our results, we focus
on some more homogenous groups of banks.
4.1 Capital and Risk
As a measure of capital, we use the amount of capital banks reports in their
￿nancial statement (Capital).10 In the literature, capital ratios￿ capital to assets
ratio or capital to risk-weighted asset ratio￿ are more popular. However, because we
want to examine whether banks under regulatory pressure would increase capital,
we think Capital is better than capital ratios. Besides, we also control for banks￿
size using the value of banks￿assets in our regressions. Moreover, we also estimate
a regression in which we use banks￿CAR as the dependent variable.
9Large private-domestic banks may trade foreign currencies while small private-domestic banks
may not. Regional development banks are owned by provincial governments, and therefore are
like state banks though they are typically small. Joint venture banks are joint ventures between
domestic- and foreign owners. Foreign banks are owned by foreign investors.
10Bank Indonesia￿ s de￿nition of capital follows Basel Accord (Basel, 2003).
12As a measure of risk, we use banks￿risk-weighted assets (Risk).11 Obviously,
risk-weighted assets are not a perfect measure of banks￿risk. First, it assumes that
the risk-weightings correctly capture the risk of di⁄erent types of assets. Secondly,
as some people have argued, the weightings are too coarse so that using Risk as
a measure of risk ignores banks￿preference putting their assets in the most risky
assets in each asset category.
Unfortunately, our data does not give us a better measure of banks￿risk, and,
for that matter, capital. At least, we believe that Capital and Risk are highly
correlated with the true banks￿capital and risk, respectively. Moreover, regulator
also uses these two measures to enforce capital requirement. This paper would then
o⁄er a look into how banks respond to capital requirement the regulator imposes
on them.
4.2 Regulatory Pressure
We use two types of measures for regulatory pressure Reg. The simplest one
is PCA measure of regulatory pressure, RegPCA, an indicator equals one if banks￿
CAR is less than the minimum capital requirement set by regulator and zero other-
wise.12 The coe¢ cient of this variable captures how much banks would increase or
decrease their capital compared to adequately capitalized banks should the bank￿ s
CAR falls below the minimum requirement.
The second one is the probabilistic measure of regulatory pressure, RegPROB.
This measure takes into account that banks￿CAR is volatile. Therefore, to avoid
failing to meet the legal requirement, banks may set a higher minimum CAR thresh-
old for themselves. We de￿ne RegPROB equals one if banks￿CAR is below some
11Again, we do not use risk ratio, the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets, for the same
reason that we do not use capital ratio.
12Normally, the minimum capital requirement is 8%. However, in the aftermath of the crises
until 2001, central bank requires 4% minimum capital requirement for some banks.
13bank-speci￿c minimum threshold and zero otherwise. We set the threshold to be
one standard deviation of banks￿CAR over the period of analysis above the legal
requirement.
4.3 Control Variables
The rest of the variables are x, a vector of banks￿speci￿c characteristics. They
are banks￿assets (Size) as measure of banks￿size, banks￿pro￿ts (Income) as a mea-
sure of banks￿ability to raise capital through retained earnings, and some dummies
for bank types (state-owned, private, foreign-owned, and joint-venture banks).
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
A set of bank ￿xed e⁄ects and time e⁄ects would complete our model. These
bank ￿xed e⁄ects would control for banks￿time-invariant characteristics, including
banks￿target capital and risk levels, Capital￿ and Risk￿. The time e⁄ects would
control for factors that may a⁄ect all banks in each period such as macroeconomic
shocks and other changes in business environment.
In some speci￿cations, especially for robustness checks, we also introduce a
dummy for public banks (TPublic) and a dummy for banks sold to strategic in-
vestors (TSold). We also use lagged risk-weighted assets (Riskt￿1) in the capital
equation and lagged capital (Capitalt￿1) in the risk equation.
5 Results
5.1 CAR Equation
Table 2 presents the results for regressions in which we use CAR as the depen-
dent variable. Regressions using PCA measure of regulatory pressure, RegPCA,
are on the left panel; those using probabilistic measure, RegPROB, are on the right
panel.
14The four columns in each panel report system GMM, ￿rst-di⁄erenced GMM,
￿xed e⁄ect and OLS estimators, respectively. The coe¢ cients of lagged dependent
variable CARt￿1 of the system GMM are as we expect from a consistent GMM
estimator: They are smaller than those of the OLS and bigger than those of the
￿xed e⁄ect. However, the coe¢ cient of CARt￿1 of the ￿rst-di⁄erenced GMM is well
below that of ￿xed e⁄ect. Therefore, we should not rely too much on the estimates
in Columns (2) and (6).
The coe¢ cient of RegPCA in Column (1), though statistically signi￿cant at 30%
level of signi￿cance only, is economically large. It suggests that undercapitalized
bank, whose CAR is lower than 8% by the end of last period and is under regulatory
pressure to comply with the capital requirement, would increase its CAR by eight
percentage points.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The coe¢ cients of RegPROB in Column (5), on the other hand, is statistically
signi￿cant at 10% level of signi￿cance and quite large economically. It suggests
that banks whose CAR are lower than their own CAR threshold last period would
increase their CAR by three percentage points.
The estimates in the left panel indicate that, to immediately comply with the
8% capital requirement, undercapitalized banks simply have to raise their CAR
more than adequately capitalized banks. The estimates in the right panel show
that banks whose CAR is falling towards the minimum requirement increase their
CAR by smaller percentage points.
The coe¢ cients of CARt￿1 in Columns (1) and (5) suggest that the speed of
CAR adjustment, ￿3, is signi￿cant both statistically and economically. Banks on
average cut the di⁄erence between previous period CAR and target CAR by about
1510% per quarter, which means banks typically halve the CAR gap within two years.
The coe¢ cients of Size and Income are positive and negative, respectively,
though they are insigni￿cant, both statistically and economically. Controlling for
other explanatory variables, including previous period capital as well as individual-
and time e⁄ects, the larger- and the more pro￿table banks do not seem to increase
their CAR faster.
Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions in Columns (1) and (5) do not reject
the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. As we expect, the tests for serial
correlation reject the null hypothesis of no ￿rst-order serial correlation of residuals
of the ￿rst-di⁄erenced equation, but do not reject the null hypothesis that there is
no second-order serial correlation.
5.2 Capital Equation
We now examine how banks increase their CAR: by increasing capital or re-
ducing risk.
Table 3 presents the results for the capital equation. Regressions using RegPCA
are on the left panel; those using RegPROB are on the right panel.
The coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable Capitalt￿1 of the system GMM
are as we expect from a consistent GMM estimator; those of the ￿rst-di⁄erenced
GMM are not, however.
The coe¢ cient of RegPCA in Column (1) is statistically signi￿cant at 20% level
of signi￿cance; economically it is also large. It suggests that undercapitalized banks
whose CAR is lower than 8% by the end of last period comply with the capital
requirement by increasing their capital by Rp 300 million on average, about 41% of
the mean of all banks￿capital.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
16The coe¢ cients of RegPROB on the right panel, on the other hand, are close
to zero and statistically insigni￿cant.
The ￿rst set of estimates indicates that, to immediately comply with the 8%
capital requirement, an undercapitalized bank simply has to raise capital more
than adequately capitalized banks. The second set of estimates shows that banks
whose CAR are falling towards the minimum requirement, as far as capital decision
is concerned, behave like any other banks. These banks may be under regulatory
pressure too, but they do not have to raise capital to increase capital ratio. Instead,
they may opt for other means like reducing risk, especially when raising capital is
very costly.
The coe¢ cients of Capitalt￿1 in Column (1) suggests that the speed of capital
adjustment, ￿1, is signi￿cant both statistically and economically. Banks on average
cut the di⁄erence between previous period capital and target capital by about 13%,
which means banks typically halve the capital gap within a year and a half.
The coe¢ cients of Size and Income are positive and statistically signi￿cant.
The larger the bank is, the more it needs to raise capital; the more pro￿table the
bank is, the more easily it could increase capital. However, controlling for other
explanatory variables, including previous period capital as well as individual- and
time e⁄ects, the impacts of Size and Income on banks￿capital decision is small.
For every Rp 1 billion increase of banks￿Size (assets) or Income, banks raise their
capital by a few million rupiahs only.
The two system GMMspeci￿cations pass the tests for overidentifying restrictions
and for serial correlation.
175.3 Risk Equation
Table 4 presents the risk equation. The coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable
Riskt￿1 of the OLS, ￿xed e⁄ect and system GMM are about the same, while that of
￿rst-di⁄erenced GMM is well below that of ￿xed e⁄ect. Though we should take the
results of this risk equation with care, we console to the fact that the coe¢ cients of
Capitalt￿1 of the system GMM are between that of OLS and that of ￿xed e⁄ect.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
The coe¢ cient of RegPCA in Column (1) is negative, though statistically in-
signi￿cant. It suggests that an undercapitalized bank, as far as risk decision is
concerned, behaves like adequately capitalized banks.
The coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable Riskt￿1 on the right panel suggest
that the system GMM is better. The coe¢ cient of RegPROB of the system GMM
is negative, though it is statistically signi￿cant at 30% level of signi￿cance only.
These estimates show that a bank whose CAR is falling towards the minimum
requirement last period may reduce risk about Rp 100 million to comply with the
capital requirement, about 3% of the mean of all banks￿risk-weighted assets.
The ￿rst set of estimates indicates that, to comply with the 8% capital require-
ment, undercapitalized banks do not rely much on reducing risk. They prefer raising
capital as we show in Table 3. On the other hand, the second set of estimates sug-
gest that banks whose CAR is falling towards the minimum requirement may do
just the opposite: They prefer reducing risk, not raising capital.13
13Do note that, unlike in the capital equation, in this risk equation we introduce the dummy for
public banks, TPublic, which is equals one for banks that have gone public and zero otherwise.
We include TPublic because using only Size and Income as control variables leads to very similar
coe¢ cients of lagged dependent variable Riskt￿1 of the OLS, ￿xed e⁄ect and system GMM. Our
estimates in the capital equation on the other hand are about the same whether we include or
TPublic not.
18The coe¢ cients of Riskt￿1 in all system GMM speci￿cations suggest that the
speed of risk adjustment, ￿2, is statistically signi￿cant in all two system GMM
speci￿cations. Unlike the speed of capital adjustment, they are very small, however.
Banks on average cut the di⁄erence between previous period risk and target risk by
about 3% per quarter, which means banks typically halve the capital gap within
almost six years.
The coe¢ cients of Size and Income are positive and are statistically signi￿cant.
Like those in the capital equation, they are not economically signi￿cant, however.
Nonetheless, these estimates suggest that the larger or the more pro￿table the bank
is, the larger the risk it could a⁄ord.
The system GMM in Columns (1) and (5) pass the usual diagnostic tests, except
Hansen test for regression in Column (5).
6 Robustness Checks
In Tables 5 and 6, we explore the robustness of our results to some changes in the
basic speci￿cations. Panel A of Table 5 shows the results in which we introduce
lagged capital into the risk equation and lagged risk into the capital equation.14
We ￿nd that banks whose CAR are below the minimum 8% tend to increase their
capital while those whose CAR are falling towards the minimum requirement tend
to reduce risk. These show that controlling for banks￿risk in the capital equation
and banks￿capital in the risk equation does not change our basic results. The
coe¢ cients are not statistically signi￿cant at conventional level, however.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
14It should be noted that, unlike previous works in this line of literature, we introduce lagged
values of capital and risks as additional explanatory variables, not their current values.
19Panel B shows estimates of speci￿cations in which we allow for heterogeneous
responses. Previously we restrict all banks, whatever their types, responding to
regulatory pressure in the same way. To allow di⁄erent type of banks to respond
di⁄erently, we introduce interactive dummies between the type of ownership dummy





￿jTypeijt￿1 ￿ Regijt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)Capitalit￿1
+￿1xit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it (16)
where Typeij is a dummy equals one if bank i has type of ownership j and zero
otherwise.
For the capital equation, in Column (1) the coe¢ cient of Type ￿ RegPCA
is statistically signi￿cant for large private-domestic banks only. Large private-
domestic banks appear to respond strongly to the capital requirement: Undercap-
italized banks raise capital by Rp 1.8 billion within one quarter. The coe¢ cients
of Type ￿ RegPROB in Column (2) are signi￿cant at 20% level of signi￿cance for
state-owned and joint-venture banks only. They are negative, however.15
For the risk equation, in Column (3) the coe¢ cients of Type ￿ RegPCA are
statistically insigni￿cant. The coe¢ cients of Type ￿ RegPROB in Column (4) are
quite signi￿cant statistically for state-owned and regional-development banks. For
the former, it is positive however, while for the latter it is economically small.
For the CAR equation in Column (5), similar picture appears: Most of the
positive e⁄ects of regulatory pressure on CAR come from undercapitalized large
15Table 6 presents the results for the system GMM for capital-, risk-, and CAR equations. There
is no state-owned and foreign-owned banks which are under regulatory pressure if we use RegPCA
and therefore their interactive terms in Columns (1), (3) and (5) drop out of the regressions.
Moreover, the interactive terms for joint-venture banks are dropped due to collinearity. All bank
types present in regressions using RegPROB in Columns (2), (4) and (6).
20private-domestic banks. Small private-domestic- and regional-development banks
seem to behave like other adequately capitalized banks.
The coe¢ cients of Type ￿ RegPROB in Column (6) are statistically signi￿cant
for state-owned and joint-venture banks while they are signi￿cant at 20% level for
small private-domestic- and regional-development banks. Many of them are neg-
ative, however. The results in Column (6) suggest that, allowing heterogeneous
responses, many of state-owned and joint-venture banks appear to have too high
capital ratios, and therefore tend to reduce their CAR even though, by our de￿ni-
tion, they are under regulatory pressure.
Panel C shows the estimates if we restrict our sample into all banks except state-
owned and foreign-owned banks. For the most part, our results are quite robust,
though many are not signi￿cant statistically at conventional level of signi￿cance.
In Table 6 we focus on more homogenous sample of banks and at the same time
explore the robustness of our results if we allow regulatory pressure to non-linearly
a⁄ect banks￿capital and risks. We also examine what happens if we allow di⁄erent
types of banks to have di⁄erent speed of adjustment.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
In Panel A, we allow banks who are signi￿cantly undercapitalized to behave
di⁄erently by introducing another dummy, CAR4 that equals one if banks￿CAR
below 4 and zero otherwise. We ￿nd that these heavily undercapitalized banks
respond the strongest to the capital requirement: primarily by raising capital, and
to lower extent by reducing risk. Controlling for CAR4, RegPCA continues being
quite signi￿cant statistically, though economically it becomes smaller. Using the
sample of private domestic banks only, for example, it equals 0.024, which is much
lower than 0.443, the coe¢ cient of CAR4.
21In Panel B, we allow undercapitalized banks to have di⁄erent speed of adjust-
ment than adequately capitalized ones. We add an interactive term between the
regulatory pressure and the lagged dependent variable such as the following:
Capitalit = ￿1RegPCAit￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿0)RegPCAit￿1 ￿ Capitalit￿1
+(1 ￿ ￿1)Capitalit￿1 + ￿1xit + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it (17)
We ￿nd that undercapitalized banks have larger speed of capital adjustment.
On the other hand, the speed of risk adjustment for both undercapitalized- and
adequately capitalized banks appears to be quite the same. Overall, controlling for
di⁄erent speed of capital- and risk adjustment, the coe¢ cients of RegPCA continue
to be quite robust.
We also do other robustness checks. First, we introduce a dummy for public
banks (TPublic) and a dummy for banks sold to strategic investors (TSold) into
the basic regressions. Overall, the coe¢ cients of regulatory pressure RegPCA and
RegPROB continue to be quite large. Second, we drop the observations during the
time when regulator imposes 4% minimum capital requirement temporarily. Third,
we also estimate the model using di⁄erent number of lagged variables as instruments
in the GMM speci￿cations. Fourth, to reduce the number of instruments in the
GMM estimators, we reestimate the regressions using yearly data only. Overall,
our basic results are quite robust.16
7 Concluding Remarks
There is some evidence that banks comply with the capital requirement: They
increase their CAR when the ratio is lower than, or approaching, the 8% regulatory
16The results are available from authors upon request.
22minimum. Banks whose CAR below 8% do so primarily by raising capital, while
banks whose CAR is falling towards the minimum requirement prefer reducing risk
rather than increasing capital.
However, some caveats are in order. First, most of our results are statistically
signi￿cant at 20-30% level of signi￿cance only.
Second, our results are mostly driven by private domestic banks; other un-
dercapitalized banks appear to respond to the capital requirement like adequately
capitalized banks. This may be because, during the period of analysis, regulator
monitored large private-domestic banks intensively. Moreover, some of these banks
were bailout by the government in the aftermath of the 1998 crises and their man-
agers perhaps were under political pressure to perform. A few of these banks￿book
in fact turned red again during the period of analysis and the government had to
recapitalize them one more time.
Third, furthermore, our results are also primarily driven by heavily-undercapitalized
banks whose CAR is lower than 4%. Once we control for regulatory pressure for
heavily-undercapitalized banks, the e⁄ect regulatory pressure on banks whose CAR
is lower than 8% but larger than 4% becomes less signi￿cant economically.
These results shed light on how banks in developing countries respond to capital
requirement. In contrast to the ￿ndings in the literature that banks in developed
countries comply with capital requirement, we do not ￿nd similarly strong evidence
of compliance in Indonesia: Statistically, banks that are under pressure from regu-
lator to increase their CAR behave just like adequately capitalized banks.
Bear in mind, however, that the ￿ndings in the past works may not be accurate
due to the simultaneous equation estimation of non-autonomous equations. More-
over, we cannot say that banks in developing countries would respond to capital
requirement like those in the developed world. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006)
23for example, using cross-country data analysis, show that strengthening the dis-
cretionary powers of prudential supervisors in countries with weak institutional
environments leads to, among others, banks that are less sound.
Therefore, whether, in normal circumstances, Indonesian banks comply with
capital requirement remains questionable. The good news is that banks do respond
to the capital requirement, however weakly. The challenge is that, if regulators
in developing countries continue relying on capital regulation, they would need to
improve their supervision capacity, increase the transparency of ￿nancial reporting,
and strengthen market monitoring of banks.
It would be interesting to see how Indonesian banks respond to capital require-
ment in the future when Indonesian economy has fully recovered, banking industry
stabilized, and regulator stopped its intensive supervision and monitoring. Because
many developing countries implement capital requirement as the key instrument in
prudential supervision of their banks, it would also important to look into whether
developing countries, whose regulators are less independent and their supervision
capacity is weaker, could really enforce capital requirement and induce banks to
limit risk taking.
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Capital Rp billion 2,468 0.73 2.37
Risk Weighted Assets Rp billion 2,468 3.36 9.86
CAR 2,469 23.40 16.79
RegPCA 2,458 0.02 0.13
RegProb 2,458 0.18 0.38
Size Rp billion 2,509 8.07 26.77
Income Rp billion 2,340 21.44 77.36
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Dependent Variable: CARt
SYS DIFF SYS DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RegPCAt-1 8.019 18.586 10.675 10.327
(7.725) (9.859) (4.737) (7.475)
RegPROBt-1 3.038 1.274 -2.123 0.899
(1.705) (2.795) (1.331) (0.821)
CARt-1 0.908 0.594 0.714 0.918 0.902 0.541 0.700 0.917
(0.046) (0.094) (0.063) (0.018) (0.047) (0.115) (0.062) (0.018)
Sizet -0.029 0.282 -0.236 -0.049 -0.023 0.144 -0.243 -0.047
(0.029) (0.305) (0.164) (0.029) (0.030) (0.256) (0.166) (0.026)
Incomet 0.011 0.031 0.022 0.017 0.009 0.027 0.022 0.016
(0.010) (0.022) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.023) (0.016) (0.010)
AR(1) -2.95 -2.64 -2.96 -2.47
AR(2) -0.65 -0.80 -0.66 -0.85
Hansen [0.132] [0.019] [0.116] [0.163]
Observations 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165
Note: The estimators are system GMM, first-differenced GMM, fixed effect and ordinary least squares. GMM results are one-
step estimates. GMM regressions include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments. All regressions include bank fixed effects
and time effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators; it uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM




Table 2: CAR Equation
27Dependent Variable: Capitalt
SYS DIFF SYS DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RegPCAt-1 0.295 0.316 0.331 0.296
(0.231) (0.278) 0.240 (0.247)
RegPROBt-1 -0.008 -0.024 -0.002 0.002
(0.023) (0.027) (0.012) (0.006)
Capitalt-1 0.873 0.745 0.848 0.916 0.875 0.748 0.840 0.911
(0.058) (0.145) (0.075) (0.039) (0.063) (0.143) (0.084) (0.046)
Sizet 0.008 0.072 0.012 0.006 0.008 0.068 0.012 0.006
(0.002) (0.035) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.033) (0.007) (0.001)
Incomet 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
AR(1) -1.92 -1.80 -1.92 -1.79
AR(2) 0.99 0.80 1.00 0.82
Hansen [0.096] [0.003] [0.055] [0.042]
Observations 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165
Note: The estimators are system GMM, first-differenced GMM, fixed effect and ordinary least squares. GMM results are one-
step estimates. GMM regressions include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments. All regressions include bank fixed effects,
time effects and TPublic. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators; it uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM




Table 3: Capital Equation
28Dependent Variable: Riskt
SYS DIFF SYS DIFF
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RegPCAt-1 -0.022 0.167 0.124 -0.029
(0.023) (0.424) (0.113) (0.032)
RegPROBt-1 -0.097 -0.141 -0.069 -0.053
(0.090) (0.141) (0.036) (0.033)
Riskt-1 0.984 0.853 0.938 0.991 0.984 0.847 0.938 0.991
(0.030) (0.094) (0.036) (0.025) (0.030) (0.101) (0.036) (0.025)
Sizet 0.015 0.367 0.105 0.015 0.015 0.378 0.105 0.015
(0.004) (0.059) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.060) (0.015) (0.003)
Incomet 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
AR(1) -1.97 -1.73 -1.96 -1.71
AR(2) -0.22 -0.55 -0.23 -0.57
Hansen [0.091] [0.001] [0.000] [0.030]
Observations 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165 2,165 1,980 2,165 2,165
Note: The estimators are system GMM, first-differenced GMM, fixed effect and ordinary least squares. GMM results are one-
step estimates. GMM regressions include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments. All regressions include bank fixed effects
and time effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation, respectively. Hansen is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions for the GMM estimators; it uses the minimized value of the corresponding two-step GMM




Table 4: Risk Equation
29Dep. Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





B. Introduce separate indicators of regulatory pressure for each type of banks
Regt-1*Type
State -0.239 0.367 -31.339
(0.194) (0.186) (2.081)
Large private 1.839 0.032 -0.057 -0.101 28.177 -0.886
(0.201) (0.047) (0.466) (0.195) (4.885) (6.393)
Small private 0.002 -0.029 0.003 -0.059 5.404 6.246
(0.010) (0.026) (0.017) (0.094) (8.676) (4.832)
Development -0.012 0.006 -0.022 -0.172 -0.599 2.079
(0.012) (0.018) (0.022) (0.104) (1.639) (1.388)
Joint venture -0.174 0.001 -9.250
(0.070) (0.108) (3.988)
Foreign 0.144 0.351 -3.517
(0.166) (0.358) (3.133)
C. Use the sample of all banks except state- and foreign banks
RegPCAt-1 0.235 -0.008 6.678
(0.166) (0.079) (7.778)
RegPROBt-1 -0.004 (0.061) 1.220
(0.029) (0.047) (1.495)
Capitalt Riskt CARt
Note: The estimator is system GMM. The results are one-step estimates of regressions that include
lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as instruments. All regressions include lagged dependent variable, Size,
Income as well as bank fixed effects and time effects. Regressions in Panel A include lagged Capital
and lagged Risk in Capital- and Risk equations, respectively. In Panel B, odd-numbered regressions use
RegPCA as measure of regulatory pressure, while even-numbered regressions use RegPROB. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. The number of observations vary between 1,924 to 2,165.
Table 5: Robustness Checks 1
30Dep. Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Introduce an indicator for banks whose CAR is lower than 4%
CAR<4 0.434 0.443 1.832 -0.012 -0.019 -0.036 -0.115 -0.019
(0.341) (0.344) (0.218) (0.013) (0.145) (0.136) (0.452) (0.009)
RegPCAt-1 0.021 0.024 0.012 0.000 (0.001) 0.018
(0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.015) (0.026) (0.010)
B. Introduce an interactive term between RegPCA and lagged Capital or lagged Risk
Capitalt-1 0.863 0.868 0.882 0.935
(0.062) (0.069) (0.059) (0.010)
RegPCAt-1*Capitalt-1 -0.556 -0.553 -22.212 0.123
(0.054) (0.063) (0.691) (0.013)
Riskt-1 0.977 0.976 0.969 0.816
(0.044) (0.047) (0.051) (0.039)
RegPCAt-1*Riskt-1 -0.011 -0.020 0.116 0.075
(0.024) (0.072) (0.519) (0.046)
Sample 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Capitalt Riskt
Note: The estimator is system GMM. The results are one-step estimates of regressions that include lagged dated t-2 and t-3 as
instruments. All regressions include lagged dependent variable, Size, Income as well as bank fixed effects and time effects. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
Samples 1 includes all banks except state banks and foreign banks; Sample 2 private-domestic banks only; Sample 3 large private-
domestic banks only; Sample 4 small private domestic banks. The number of observations for Samples 1-4 are 1,925, 1,224, 581, and
643, respectively.
Table 6: Robustness Checks 2
31